Broken VPNs, the Year 2038, and certs that expired 100 years ago

# · 🔥 152 · 💬 57 · 14 days ago · www.theregister.com · kdp747 · 📷
"These devices authenticated to each other with certificates much like the ones used for HTTPS, but signed by a private certificate authority," he explained. "Each customer had their own CA for this. Part of the process of validating the certificates is asking the CA if the certificate has been revoked. The validation was failing because the VPN box couldn't download the certificate revocation list to confirm the peer's certificate wasn't on it. Why couldn't it download the CRL?". Checking the VPN device's certificate operation log showed that the CRL was too big to be downloaded, he found. A 2015 paper [PDF] on certificate revocation published by University of Maryland researchers notes that the CRL size for the median certificate is 51KB and that half of all CRLs are under 900B. This one was nearly 1MB, and Zimmie discovered the size was due to the CA repeatedly revoking and reissuing every certificate it signed once per second. "Fortunately, the certificate authority had a certificate operation log," recounted Zimmie. "This log records every time the CA revokes a certificate, signs a new one, or performs a few other operations. Looking at the most recent entries, I see the CA process woke up, decided the CA's own certificate is expired, then revoked and reissued every certificate it had signed. I look further back, and I see it did the same process one second earlier. And one second before that." These digital certificates, according to Zimmie, have two dates: notBefore, a date before which they're not valid; and notAfter, a date after which they're expired. Zimmie checked the CA's automatic renewal code and confirmed that it won't reissue the certificate with an earlier start date when it expires.
Broken VPNs, the Year 2038, and certs that expired 100 years ago



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